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The Death of Oakes: Time for a 
Rights-Specific Approach? 
Christopher D. Bredt and Heather K. Pessione* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its seminal 1986 decision in R. v. Oakes,1 the Supreme Court of 
Canada first promulgated a framework for the application of section 1 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 From the outset, the 
Oakes test was intended to be a “stringent standard of justification” to be 
applied in a common or universal manner to all Charter breaches. This 
“one size fits all” approach has proven to be problematic. In short, 
attempts to shoehorn all section 1 analysis into an Oakes framework have 
led to a dilution of the Oakes test, and a context-driven and unpredictable 
approach. The thesis of this paper is that the time has come to abandon 
the Oakes test, and develop in its place a rights-specific approach to 
section 1 analysis.3 
To develop this thesis, the paper first reviews briefly the Oakes test 
as it was originally articulated. The next section describes how the Oakes 
test has been eroded through definitional balancing, diluted through the 
contextual approach and the weakening of the evidentiary requirement, 
and in some cases not applied at all. We then review the movement to-
wards a rights-specific approach in Israel, and the Dagenais/Mentuck 
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1  [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].  
2  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3  Some of the ideas developed in the paper were considered in Christopher D. Bredt & 
Adam M. Dodek, “The Increasing Irrelevance of Section 1 of the Charter” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
175 and C. Bredt, “The Right to Equality and Oakes: Time for Change” (2010) 27 N.J.C.L. 59. 
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test, wherein the Supreme Court has explicitly abandoned Oakes. In the 
final section, we argue that the Supreme Court’s struggles with Oakes are 
inherent in any attempt to apply a universal approach to the myriad of 
rights protected by the Charter, and conclude that transparency, predict-
ability and fairness dictate that the Court adopt an explicitly rights-
specific approach to section 1 balancing. 
II. THE OAKES TEST: “A STRINGENT STANDARD  
OF JUSTIFICATION” 
Section 1 of the Charter provides that it “guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.4 
The Canadian approach — to include an explicit limitation clause rather 
than relying on the courts to shape the analysis with respect to the bal-
ancing of competing interests — is consistent with international human 
rights conventions,5 and is in contrast to the American Bill of Rights, 
which does not contain an explicit balancing clause.6 
The wording of section 1 was a matter of some debate during the 
drafting of the Charter. A previous iteration of section 1 allowed for lim-
its on rights that were “generally accepted in a free and democratic 
society”.7 The addition of “reasonable” and “demonstrably justified” to 
the final text of section 1 reflects the intention that limitations on Charter 
rights be held to what the Supreme Court later referred to as a “stringent 
standard of justification”.8 
Although the Charter came into effect in 1982, the Supreme Court of 
Canada did not provide a comprehensive framework for the justification 
of limitations on Charter rights under section 1 until 1986. In Oakes, 
Dickson C.J.C. articulated the four-part “section 1 test” which has con-
tinued to be applied for over 25 years, and, as Hogg has put it, “has taken 
on some of the character of holy writ”:9 
                                                                                                             
4  Charter, supra, note 2, s. 1. 
5  Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell), 
at 38-2 and 38-3 [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
6  Id., at 38-3. 
7  E. Mendes, “The Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judicial Deference in the 
Context of Section 1” (2005) 27 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47, at 51. 
8  Oakes, supra, note 1, at para. 65. 
9  Hogg, supra, note 5, at 38-17. 
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To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied.  
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a 
Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be “of sufficient 
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or 
freedom”. The standard must be high in order to ensure that objectives 
which are trivial or discordant with the principles integral to a free and 
democratic society do not gain s. 1 protection. It is necessary, at a 
minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and 
substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be 
characterized as sufficiently important. 
Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the 
party invoking s. 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. This involves “a form of proportionality test”. 
Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on 
the circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the 
interests of society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in 
my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, 
the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the 
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to 
the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the 
objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the 
right or freedom in question”. Third, there must be a proportionality 
between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting 
the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been 
identified as of “sufficient importance”.10  
A few points with respect to the Oakes test merit consideration at this 
stage. 
First, although Oakes requires that that a government actor which 
seeks to uphold a violation of rights satisfy a four-part test, as Hogg has 
observed, it is the third step of the test — “minimum impairment”11 — 
upon which nearly all section 1 cases have turned.12 
                                                                                                             
10  Oakes, supra, note 1, at paras. 69-70 (citations omitted). 
11  Hogg, supra, note 5, cautions that it is not accurate to describe the test as the “minimal 
impairment” test, “because the word ‘minimal’ carries the connotation of trivial or slight, and a 
justified limit on a Charter right might be quite a severe limit on the right” (at 38-36). As is 
summarized later in this paper, the dilution of the Oakes test has clearly transformed Dickson 
C.J.C.’s “minimal impairment” test into a “minimum impairment” test. 
12  Hogg, id., at 38-18. 
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Second, there is a tension in the case itself regarding the universal 
applicability of Oakes. Although the test is styled (and has subsequently 
been interpreted) as a test to be applied every time that section 1 is 
engaged, Dickson C.J.C. recognized that the test had to maintain some 
flexibility in order to respond to the variable rights and freedoms 
engaged by the Charter, and the factual scenarios which will be the 
subject of section 1 justification: 
With respect to the third component, it is clear that the general effect of 
any measure impugned under s. 1 will be the infringement of a right or 
freedom guaranteed by the Charter; this is the reason why resort to s. 1 
is necessary. The inquiry into effects must, however, go further. A wide 
range of rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Charter, and an 
almost infinite number of factual situations may arise in respect of 
these. Some limits on rights and freedoms protected by the Charter will 
be more serious than others in terms of the nature of the right or 
freedom violated, the extent of the violation, and the degree to which 
the measures which impose the limit trench upon the integral principles 
of a free and democratic society. Even if a objective is of sufficient 
importance, and the first two elements of the proportionality test are 
satisfied, it is still possible that, because of the severity of the 
deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups will not be 
justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the 
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must 
be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.13  
Third, although Dickson C.J.C. described the Oakes test as a “stringent 
standard of justification”,14 just a few months later in Edwards Books,15 the 
minimum impairment arm of the test had already been softened. In that 
case, Dickson C.J.C. amended the “as little as possible” language with 
respect to least drastic means to “as little as is reasonably possible”.16 As 
we describe in greater detail below, this was but the first step in the 
dilution of Oakes.  
                                                                                                             
13  Oakes, supra, note 1, at para. 71. 
14  Id., at para. 65. 
15  R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.). 
16  Id., at para. 126. 
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III. THE FALL OF OAKES: DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS 
The notion that the Oakes test has been diluted from the outset has 
been described by Sujit Choudhry as the “dominant narrative” with re-
spect to its legacy.17 In this section, we discuss a number of examples 
which demonstrate how this dilution has taken place. First, the Court has 
consistently engaged in a balancing of interests in defining the scope of 
the rights protected by the Charter, rather than leaving it to the section 1 
analysis. Second, the “stringent standard of justification” promised in 
Oakes has been softened, both through the use of a contextual approach 
to section 1 analysis, and through the weakening of the evidentiary 
threshold required to support a section 1 justification. Finally, in certain 
contexts, the Court has expressly allowed for the section 1 analysis to be 
done without applying Oakes at all. 
1. Definitional Balancing 
The language and structure of the Charter dictate that the 
determination of whether a right has been infringed is confined to the first, 
“definitional” stage of the analysis, and that balancing rights and freedoms 
against reasonable limits on those rights and freedoms is undertaken 
separately, within the section 1 analysis. However, notwithstanding this 
clear distinction between definition/breach and justification, the Court has 
increasingly moved the justification analysis into the definitional stage of 
its Charter analysis. 
In some cases, such a shift has been the inevitable result of language 
which suggests some balancing in the definition of the right. For example, 
section 7 of the Charter provides that: “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Section 8 
protects against “unreasonable search and seizure”, and section 9 
entrenches the right not to be “arbitrarily detained or imprisoned”. Thus, the 
language of sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Charter mandate an internal balancing 
at the definitional stage of the analysis.18 Given the internal balancing that 
                                                                                                             
17  Sujit Choudhry, “So What is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality 
Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501. 
18  There are other examples: s. 11(a) entrenches the right “to be informed without unreasonable 
delay of the specific offence”; s. 11(b) provides for the right “to be tried within a reasonable time”; and 
s. 11(d) provides for the right “not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause”. 
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takes place at the definition/breach stage of these Charter rights, it is not 
surprising that section 1 rarely plays a role in the analysis of these rights, or 
that when it does it is duplicative of the analysis of breach.19 
However, even where the language of the Charter does not compel 
balancing at the definitional stage, the Court often imports a balancing 
analysis in determining whether the right has been infringed. The best ex-
ample of this approach is the Court’s tortured section 15 equality analysis. 
(a)  Section 15 
The Court recently revisited the test for an infringement of section 15(1) 
in R. v. Kapp,20 finding that, going forward, the test should consist of the 
following questions: (1) Does the law create a distinction based on an 
enumerated or analogous ground?; and (2) Does the distinction create a 
disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotype (i.e., is it discrimi-
natory)? The Court moved away from the “human dignity” analysis 
employed in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion),21 replacing it with the concept of “discrimination”. 
One of the main critiques of the Law test had been that it improperly 
shifted balancing and justification from the section 1 analysis to the 
section 15 analysis.22 However, despite Kapp the Court has continued to 
employ a “contextual analysis” at the definitional stage of the section 15(1) 
analysis, and has thereby continued to include the types of considerations 
typically included in a section 1 analysis into the definitional stage. In 
fact, Hogg has suggested that the second arm of the section 15 test set 
out in Kapp “seems to come down to an assessment by the Court of the 
legitimacy of the statutory purpose and the reasonableness of using a 
listed or analogous ground to accomplish that purpose”.23 
In Withler v. Canada (Attorney General),24 the Court recently con-
sidered whether multiple different approaches to the calculation of a 
                                                                                                             
19  In Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.), Lamer J. (as he then was) stated that s. 1 could only justify an 
infringement of s. 7 in “exceptional circumstances, such as natural disaster, war or epidemic” 
(at para. 85). Justice Wilson opined in the same case that s. 1 could never justify an infringement of 
s. 7 (at para. 105). 
20  [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.). 
21  [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.). 
22  See Christopher D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: 
A New Paradigm for Section 15” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33. 
23  Hogg, supra, note 5, at 55031. 
24  [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.). 
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“supplementary” lump sum federal death benefit on the basis of the age 
amounted to a violation of section 15(1) of the Charter. The Court held 
that the legislation creates a distinction on the basis of age, but does not 
create a disadvantage, based on a contextual analysis akin to that set out 
by Hogg in his critique of Kapp. The Court held that the purpose of the 
benefit, which was only one part of a package of survivor benefits, was 
not to provide a long-term income stream for surviving spouses,25 and 
the reductions in benefits for survivors aged 65 and older reflected the 
fact that a younger group of survivors would have different needs. The 
Court concluded that the “package of benefits, viewed as a whole and 
over time, does not impose or perpetuate discrimination”.26  
Another recent section 15 case, Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation 
v. Canada,27 provides a further example of this “contextual approach”. In 
Ermineskin, the Court considered whether the payment of oil and gas 
royalties to First Nations pursuant to the Indian Act, in contrast with roy-
alty payments to non-Aboriginals, was in violation of section 15 of the 
Charter. Again, the Court held that the legislation creates a distinction, 
but not a disadvantage, citing an early section 15 case, R. v. Turpin:28 
In determining whether there is discrimination on grounds relating to 
the personal characteristics of the individual or group, it is important to 
look not only at the impugned legislation which has created a 
distinction that violates the right to equality but also the larger social, 
political and legal context.29 
The contextual approach which the Court applies to section 15 juris-
prudence clearly duplicates the balancing and justification inherent in the 
section 1 analysis. The result of such “definitional balancing” has been to 
further marginalize section 1 (and, necessarily, any robust or thoughtful 
application of the Oakes test). 
Although the Court seems to be making some attempts to address 
this issue, most recently in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A.,30 it has not 
                                                                                                             
25  “For younger plan members, the purpose of the supplementary death benefit is to insure 
against unexpected death at a time when the deceased member’s surviving spouse would be 
unprotected by a pension or entitled to limited pension funds. For older members, the purpose of the 
supplementary death benefit is to assist surviving spouses with the costs of the plan member’s last 
illness and death.” Id., at para. 5. 
26  Id., at para. 81. 
27  [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ermineskin”]. 
28  [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.). 
29  Ermineskin, supra, note 27, at para. 193. 
30  [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lola”].  
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yet been successful. In that case, A. (“Lola”) applied for a declaration 
that certain spousal support and property provisions of the Civil Code of 
Québec31 were discriminatory under section 15(1), on the grounds that 
those provisions denied de facto spouses protection that was offered to 
spouses who were either married or in a civil union.  
While the decisions of Abella, Deschamps and LeBel JJ. engaged in 
significant public policy analysis at the definition/breach stage, McLachlin 
C.J.C. preferred to undertake much of the same equality analysis under 
section 1. She argued that public policy considerations are more 
appropriate to a proportionality analysis than a discrimination analysis: 
[I]t is important to maintain the analytical distinction between s. 15 and 
s. 1. While the public policy basis for legislation has a limited relevance 
to the s. 15 analysis, it is central to the s. 1 inquiry. This flows from the 
two-stage model of constitutional review inherent in the Charter.32 
Chief Justice McLachlin therefore preferred to separate the question 
of whether a disadvantage arising from a legislated distinction amounts 
to discrimination (properly answered under section 15) from whether that 
discrimination was reasonable when balanced against other public policy 
considerations (properly answered under section 1). 
This approach may appear on an initial review to be a step in the right 
direction, as it addresses some of the concerns with respect to duplication. 
However, it remains to be seen how this aspect of Lola will be applied go-
ing forward; it is likely that most section 15 cases will continue analyze 
public policy considerations primarily at the definition/breach stage of the 
analysis rather than in the analysis of justification under section 1. In any 
event, Lola fails to shift other aspects of equality balancing, apart from 
public policy concerns, to the section 1 analysis. 
(b)  Section 2(b) — Public Forum Analysis 
Generally speaking, the Court has taken a robust approach to the 
section 1 justification analysis in freedom of expression cases, due to the 
broad definition of section 2(b) of the Charter, which encompasses any 
attempt to convey meaning. As a result of the broad definition of the 
                                                                                                             
31  S.Q. 1991, c. 64. 
32  Lola, supra, note 30, at para. 421 (citation omitted). Although disagreeing on the result, 
Abella J. concurred that the reasonableness of the distinction was a question properly left for s. 1. 
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right, section 2(b) cases have been at the forefront of section 1 analysis.33 
However, an exception to this approach is the Court’s analysis of “public 
forum” issues — the right of freedom of expression on public property.  
In Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada,34 the Court 
confronted the public forum issue for the first time, and split on the  
appropriate stage of the analysis to balance the competing interests. The 
majority of the Court35 adopted an analytical approach that required that 
the balancing inherent in public forum cases — between the interests of 
the individual and the interests of government — take place at the defini-
tion/breach stage, as well as at the section 1 stage, of the analysis. Only 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. would have taken an approach that mandated that the 
balancing take place as part of the section 1 analysis. 
More recently, in Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc.,36 the 
Court reviewed and revised its analytical approach to public forum 
issues. The Court reiterated that despite the fact that “all expressive 
content is worthy of protection, the method or location of the expression 
may not be”.37 In order to perform this “screening” analysis, the Court 
engages in significant balancing at the definition/breach stage, and 
develops a test for future application which the Court affirms is the 
responsibility of the Charter claimant to satisfy. The Court goes on to 
address potential concerns with this approach: 
Another concern is whether the proposed test screens out expression 
which merits protection, on the one hand, or admits too much clearly 
unprotected expression on the other. Our jurisprudence requires broad 
protection at the s. 2(b) stage [but] also reflects the reality that some places 
must remain outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b). People must know 
where they can and cannot express themselves and governments should 
not be required to justify every exclusion or regulation of expression 
under s. 1. As six of seven judges of this Court agreed in Committee for 
the Commonwealth of Canada, the test must provide a preliminary 
screening process. Otherwise, uncertainty will prevail and governments 
                                                                                                             
33  See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]; Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), 
[1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”]. 
34  [1991] S.C.J. No. 3, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.). 
35  Id., per Lamer C.J.C., La Forest J.  
36  [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.). 
37  Id., at para. 60 (emphasis in original). 
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will be continually forced to justify restrictions which, viewed from the 
perspective of history and common sense, are entirely appropriate.38 
However, this is precisely the function of the section 1 analysis: to 
ensure that the government bears the onus of justifying restrictions on the 
rights and freedoms protected by the Charter. 
It is important to note that the effect of the Court’s use of definitional 
balancing is to shift the evidentiary burden from the government to Char-
ter claimants. This shift of the evidentiary burden is accompanied by the 
Court’s willingness to dilute the government’s evidentiary burden at the 
section 1 stage, which is discussed below. Together, the result is to sub-
stantially weaken Oakes’ “stringent standard of justification”. 
2.  Dilution of the Strictness of Oakes 
(a)  The Contextual Approach to Section 1 
The emphasis on context that the Court has imported into the 
definition/breach stage of the analysis is mirrored in the contextualization 
of the section 1 analysis. The approach of the Court has been to recognize 
that a protected right or freedom may be assigned a different value 
depending on the context of the alleged breach. This approach to the 
application of the Oakes test originates in a decision of Wilson J. in 
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General),39 where she wrote: 
The contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the aspect of 
the right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well as the 
relevant aspects of any values in competition with it. It seems to be 
more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular 
facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just 
compromise between the two competing values under s. 1.40 
The contextual approach was quickly adopted by the Court and re-
mains an integral part of its section 1 analysis. In many cases, the 
contextual approach is expressly used as a means of diluting the stringent 
standard of justification otherwise required by Oakes. 
Further evidence of “contextual” balancing in the section 1 analysis is 
found in the Court’s willingness to defer to legislative choices in a number 
                                                                                                             
38  Id., at para. 79. 
39  Supra, note 33. 
40  Id., at 1355-56. 
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of circumstances, starting with its decision in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec 
(Attorney General).41 In that case, the Court drew a distinction between 
cases where the legislature was attempting to strike a balance between the 
claims of competing groups and those cases where “the government is best 
characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has 
been infringed”.42 The Court’s rationale for this distinction was that the 
government is well-placed to analyze the claims of competing groups, but 
the courts are better positioned to analyze disputes between the 
government and individuals. On this basis, the Court purported to justify a 
higher level of scrutiny in so-called “singular antagonist” cases, and a 
higher level of deference in cases where competing groups are in 
competition for scarce resources. Regardless of whether there is a 
legitimate policy which underpins this distinction,43 there is no question 
that the Court’s explicit recognition of deference to the legislature in 
certain circumstances has weakened the application of the Oakes test. 
(b)  Weakening of the Evidentiary Requirement 
As noted above, the shifting of the balancing analysis from section 1 
to the definition/breach stage also shifts the onus from the government to 
the claimant. However, this is not the only means that the court has 
employed to weaken the strictness of the Oakes test. The Court has also 
significantly reduced the strictness of the evidentiary standard at the 
section 1 stage of the analysis through the development of a “reasoned 
apprehension of harm” test.44 
                                                                                                             
41  Supra, note 33. 
42  Id., at 994. 
43  Arguably, there is none. The paradigm case of the “singular antagonist” would appear to 
be the criminal law. However, there is frequently balancing of interests and competing demands in 
Charter review of criminal provisions. In subsequent criminal law cases such as R. v. Keegstra, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) (a challenge to the hate speech provisions in the 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46), the Court did not make reference to the stricter requirement 
when the state is acting as a singular antagonist. 
44  In other contexts, the Court has required that the government meet a higher threshold in 
order to justify a Charter breach. For example, in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), the government was held to a standard 
of “demonstrable justification”, and in R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mentuck”] the government was held to a standard of “convincing evidence”. 
The shifting sands of the s. 1 evidentiary standard provide a further concern with respect to certainty 
and predictability, particularly for Charter claimants, but also for the Crown. 
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A good example of this approach is the Court’s decision in R. 
v. Butler.45 In that case, the Court considered whether the Criminal Code 
definition of “obscenity” infringed section 2(b) of the Charter. It held that 
the definition was an infringement of section 2(b), but that the 
infringement was justified under section 1. In Butler, the Court concluded 
that, in the face of inconclusive social science evidence, Parliament was 
entitled to proceed on the basis of a “reasoned apprehension of harm”, 
and relieved the government of its obligation to prove a clear link 
between obscenity and harm to society on a balance of probabilities as 
would normally be required in order to justify a breach under section 1.46 
Another example of this approach is the Court’s decision in Harper 
v. Canada (Attorney General),47 which considered limits on third party 
spending in federal elections. The Attorney General offered no evidence 
to support a connection between third party spending and electoral fair-
ness. Despite this lacuna, the majority framed the analysis as follows: 
The legislature is not required to provide scientific proof based on 
concrete evidence of the problem it seeks to address in every case. 
Where the court is faced with inconclusive or competing social science 
evidence relating the harm to the legislature’s measures, the court may 
rely on a reasoned apprehension of that harm.  
… 
On balance, the contextual factors favour a deferential approach to 
Parliament in determining whether the third party advertising expense 
limits are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Given the difficulties in measuring this harm, a reasoned apprehension 
that the absence of third party election advertising limits will lead to 
electoral unfairness is sufficient.48  
                                                                                                             
45  [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Butler”]. 
46  Butler was applied in R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.) and 
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) to again relieve the government of the usual burden of demonstrating harm 
and to support a s. 1 justification of infringements of s. 2(b). 
47  [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.). 
48  Id., at paras. 77, 88 (emphasis added). 
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3. By-Passing Oakes: Charter Values 
In Doré v. Barreau du Québec,49 the Supreme Court recently affirmed 
that Charter analysis can proceed in some circumstances without applying 
Oakes at all. 
In Doré, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tribunal 
des professions that a disciplinary reprimand issued by the Barreau du 
Québec’s Disciplinary Council for a discourteous private letter sent to a 
sitting judge was a reasonable limitation of a lawyer’s right to freedom of 
expression. 
Justice Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, proposed that 
administrative decisions that undertook a proportionality analysis of 
Charter rights were to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, using 
administrative law principles, rather than scrutinized on the basis of the 
Oakes test. She notes that this is consistent with the Court’s approach in 
previous cases to the application of Charter values to common law 
principles, where no Oakes analysis has been required.50 This suggests that 
the Oakes test will not be applied when a Charter question is raised with 
respect to the exercise of discretion in an administrative forum, as it need 
not be applied by either the administrative body or in subsequent judicial 
review. Given the wide jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to decide 
Charter questions, as was recently affirmed in R. v. Conway,51 this is a 
significant departure from the supposed universality of the Oakes test.52  
IV. TIME TO ABANDON OAKES — TOWARD  
A RIGHTS-SPECIFIC APPROACH 
1. International Perspectives 
Instead of trying to apply Oakes universally to the section 1 analysis, 
the Supreme Court of Canada should begin to construct rights-specific 
section 1 tests to suit the context of the various rights and freedoms pro-
tected by the Charter. This has been the approach taken to the 
                                                                                                             
49  [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R 395 (S.C.C.). 
50  Id., at para. 39. See also R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.). 
51  [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 (S.C.C.). 
52  The Court in Doré also affirms that administrative law decisions on Charter values will 
be reviewed on the basis of reasonableness rather than correctness. This reinforces the gap between 
the application of the “strict standard” required by Oakes and the deferential approach taken to the 
review of the exercise of statutory discretion in Doré. 
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interpretation of the United States Bill of Rights — although the Bill of 
Rights does not contain an explicit justification clause akin to section 1 
of the Charter, the American judiciary clearly and explicitly engages in 
balancing of competing interests in determining whether fundamental 
rights have been infringed. Importantly, the balancing that takes place in 
the American jurisprudence is rights-specific — there is no attempt to 
develop a universal approach.53  
A similar approach is emerging in the Israeli jurisprudence. Justice 
Aharon Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has writ-
ten about the similarity between the limitation clauses in the Canadian 
and Israeli human rights provisions, noting that the Israeli provision was 
influenced by section 1 of the Charter.54 He notes that although Israel 
initially followed Canada’s lead and applied a universal justification test, 
regardless of the right invoked by a Charter litigant, the Supreme Court 
of Israel has more recently applied a rights-specific approach to justifica-
tion. As he puts it: 
[F]or the purposes of safeguarding human rights against limitations by 
law, not all rights are of equal status. The status of the right to human 
dignity is not the same as the status of a property right, and, within the 
framework of the same right, the extent of protection from limitation 
may vary. Thus, for example, the extent of protection from limitation of 
the freedom of commercial expression in the framework of a specific 
aspect of a right (such as political speech), a limitation upon the core of 
the right is not the same as a limitation upon its outer rim.55 
President Barak proposes a proportionality analysis (at the fourth 
stage of Oakes) which explicitly acknowledges a rights-specific hierar-
chy. However, his approach has been criticized on the basis that a focus 
on the fourth step of the Oakes test does not resolve one of the central 
concerns with a universal section 1 analysis: the “balancing” it calls for 
remains too subjective and lacks rigor and certainty.56 
                                                                                                             
53  For example, certain grounds of discrimination, such as race, are strictly scrutinized, 
while others, such as age, are typically held to a lower standard of scrutiny. 
54  Aharon Barak, “Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 369, 
at 370. 
55  Id., at 371-72. 
56  See Sara Weinrib, “The Emergence of the Third Step of the Oakes Test in Alberta 
v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 68(2) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 77-97, at para. 53. 
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2. The Dagenais/Mentuck Model 
In some instances, the Supreme Court has already adopted a rights-
specific approach. A good example of this is the Dagenais/Mentuck test, 
which was developed and is applied in the context of section 2(b) cases 
which engage the open court principle. The Court explicitly acknowl-
edged in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.57 and R. v. Mentuck58 
that the balancing of freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial 
requires a specially designed test in instances where a publication ban is 
sought. The test dictates that a publication ban should only be ordered 
where it is shown to be necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to 
the fairness of the trial, and where reasonably available alternative meas-
ures would not prevent the risk. In addition, the test dictates that “the 
salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious impact 
the ban has on free expression”.59 
The Dagenais/Mentuck test reflects the principles underlying the 
Oakes test — necessity and proportionality — while recognizing that 
particular circumstances require a context-specific test, and provides 
Charter litigants with a more predictable, transparent and coherent ap-
proach to the justification analysis. It therefore provides a helpful model 
which the Court may look to in developing context-specific approaches 
tailored to other rights protected by the Charter.60  
                                                                                                             
57  [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”]. 
58  Supra, note 44. 
59  Id.; Dagenais, supra, note 57. The Court recently applied the Dagenais/Mentuck 
approach to the balancing of the open court principle and freedom of religion in R. v. S. (N.), [2012] 
S.C.J. No. 72, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 726 (S.C.C.), where it considered the right of the complainant in a 
sexual assault case to testify wearing a niqab and the right of the accused to a fair trial.  
60  A similar rights-specific approach to s. 1 analysis of s. 2(b) Charter claims is proposed by 
Chanakya Sethi in “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom of Expression Under the 
Charter” (2012) 17 Appeal 21. Sethi reviews the s. 2(b) analysis undertaken in Charter cases and 
concludes that the Court has suggested a hierarchy among different types of expression, with laws 
that limit political expression being strictly scrutinized, and laws that draw distinctions on the basis 
of commercial expression being held to a less rigorous standard of scrutiny. Sethi goes on to propose 
a s. 1 test which reflects these varied approaches, with three tiers of scrutiny of limits on expressive 
rights: “Each of these tiers can be applied under section 1 to ratchet up — or down — the level of 
scrutiny given by courts to proposed limits on the right, including the appropriate level of deference 
given to Parliament” (at para. 42). 
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V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE COURT’S  
STRUGGLE WITH OAKES 
The examples discussed above — the Court’s use of definitional 
balancing, the contextual approach to definitional balancing and to 
section 1, the weakening and shifting evidentiary requirements, and the 
deference afforded by the Court — demonstrate that Oakes as a universal 
standard is not working. Implicit in the Court’s jurisprudence is a 
recognition that not all rights are the same, and the factors that are 
relevant to the balancing of competing interests differ accordingly. Thus, 
any attempt to revert to a universal and stringent application of Oakes 
will devolve into the same fragmented approach that we see today.  
The time has come to recognize that a universal approach does not 
make sense, and to explicitly abandon Oakes in favour of a rights-
specific approach. Such an approach will enable the Court to tailor its 
section 1 analysis to the particular context, and to do so without being 
tied to Oakes. The Court is already moving in this direction in specific 
areas, as the Dagenais/Mentuck test and its application illustrates.  
More importantly, a rights-specific approach will have a salutary effect 
on the rule of law. First, the current approach can be unduly complicated 
and repetitive — the current section 15 analysis requires that the same 
factors be considered both in determining whether section 15 has been 
breached, and then again in applying the Oakes analysis. A simpler rights-
specific approach would clearly assist the lower courts as well as Charter 
litigants. Second, the current approach lacks transparency and 
predictability — in part caused by the Court’s artificial attempt to maintain 
the universal application of Oakes, while in fact applying a context 
specific approach. A rights-specific approach will require the Court to 
more clearly articulate the factors relevant to a section 1 inquiry for each 
specific right. The rule of law demands no less.  
 
